

prepared for DCI for TV  
appearance on "One on One" with  
John McLaughlin (8Jun86)

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- You seem way out in front and frankly alone on this business of stopping leaks. Is that true? (Nonsense. All the senior officials of the government are deeply concerned about the problem of leaks and I feel that there is both a great deal of sympathy and support for my efforts including as you heard from the President only a couple of days ago at the highest level.)
- It's said that you are trying to chill the freedom of the press or tell the press what to write. Is this true? (Absolutely not. I and my colleagues in the Intelligence Community are deeply alarmed at the number of compromises of unique and fragile intelligence collection assets both technical and human. Without these collection capabilities, our ability to protect the nation, including a free press, is greatly jeopardized. Our concerns are highly focused and very narrow and do not extend whatsoever into any effort to curb criticism of the government or press revelations of wrong-doing, abuse, malfescence and incompetence -- which I applaud.)
- Why has the 1950 Comint law not been used before? (It has been used before against government officials such as Boyce and

others. This is simply the first time we have talked about applying other parts of the law which pertain to the act of publishing communications intelligence information. Frankly, we have turned to it because the number of leaks and revelations about our communications intelligence capability have become so numerous and so damaging that we are deeply concerned about our ability to carry out our warning responsibilities both vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, other adversaries and terrorism. The compromises of sensitive collection assets have become so serious that we are forced to turn to every available statutory and administrative means to try and stop the flow of intelligence source information.)

-- You seem awfully far out in front for a DCI in the struggle for assistance for the Contras. Is this consistent with the DCI's non-policy making role? (We have been active in providing to the Administration and to the Congress intelligence information on what is going on in Nicaragua and Nicaragua's activities throughout the region. I believe that activity is completely consistent with our charter and is entirely proper.)

-- Is our counterintelligence a failure? (There is no question but that we have serious setbacks in 1985 with Howard, Pelton and others. I'm heartened by the fact that we caught these people, but as you might expect dismayed that these penetrations were made in the first place. The damage has been substantial. We have been taking actions over the last several years to

strengthen our counterintelligence and security capability and will continue to give this problem the highest priority.)

-- You and CIA have become the point in Ronald Reagan's foreign policy. Is this appropriate and are you comfortable with this role? (Well, the situation is different than you describe. The country faces a number of challenges abroad and the President has a number of instruments of foreign policy to use in meeting those challenges. The country's intelligence capability is one of those instruments and we fulfill the responsibilities that are assigned to us.)

-- You are sometimes characterized as the great case officer. Is it true that you spend most of your time on covert action type activities? (Not at all. In fact, just as the Agency itself spends 90% of its time on collection and assessment of information, I spend that proportion of my time on management, collection and assessment issues.)

-- How are your relations with the Congress at this time? (I think our relationship with the Oversight Committees is fundamentally a strong one. The Committees have been exceptionally supportive of our resource needs over the years including Mal and frankly I believe the relationship is a positive one at this point.

-- How are you and Dave Durenberger getting along? (We talk frequently and have a useful and constructive dialogue. The

Chairman has been very supportive of our resource needs and I would regard him as very supportive of intelligence generally.)

-- What's the effect on U.S. intelligence of Gramm-Rudman? (We are being squeezed very hard.)

-- What about the impact of all the recent launch failures on our recent capabilities? (There is no question that we have had some setbacks. Our capabilities remain strong but are stretched very thin and we are working urgently with the Department of Defense to recover in this area.

-- What is the Administration going to do about leaks? We have the impression that everyone has backed off from action. (People have not backed away. There concern remains high and I think there is general agreement on the need to investigate serious leaks particularly affecting intelligence capabilities more aggressively and also to have some greater degree of accountability in terms of who talks about such matters to the press.)

-- Who's ahead in the spy race? The KGB or CIA. (Each side has its own strengths. For my part, I wouldn't trade our capabilities for their under any circumstances. I think we're in good shape.)

-- How concerned are you about spying by friendly powers in the United States? (Our primary counterintelligence target of course

must be the primary threat -- the Soviet Union. We are of course sensitive to the fact that there are many others who attempt to carry out intelligence activities in the United States including friendly and neutral states. This essentially, however, is the responsibility of the FBI and I would remind you that our responsibilities for counterintelligence in effect begin at the water's edge and the FBI is responsible for everything within the United States. I have been terribly impressed with the improvement and FBI capabilities in recent years in this area and we are cooperating closely with them.

-- You say that your analysis has improved. How do you know? (1. Through the impact on policy and the degree to which intelligence is used in the policy process. 2. The views of the users as communicated to us. 3. The fact that whether critical or supportive policymakers across the board are coming back to us for more and more to the point where our resources are stretched to the limit and 4) our own view of our work, as substantiated by the extensive use of outside panels, reviewers and critics.)

-- How come you won't tell Americans what the Russians already know? (How does the press know what the Russians know. Do you have penetrations of the KGB. The press cannot know the degree to which their reporting amplifies on what a spy is given, confirms what a spy is given or updates what a spy is given. They do their work in much the same way as we, piecing together lots of small bits of information. They probably rarely give

full credence to a single source and when the American media independently confirms or adds credibility to the views of their source, the information is thereby enhanced.